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INTRODUCTION 
Transgender students are vulnerable to discrimination, exclusion, and 
harassment. For proof of this fact, one need only consider a cursory collection 
of recent events reported in the media. Parents of a six-year-old transgender girl 
in Colorado mounted a challenge to her school's decision to exclude her from 
the girls' bathroom.' Smith College, an all-women's college in Northampton, 
Massachusetts, refused to consider the application of a transgender female 
student due ostensibly to a male gender marker appearing on one component of 
her application.2 A transgender woman student announced that she was suing 
California Baptist University for expelling her after she outed herself in an 
appearance on a program on MTV.3 A transgender woman student-athlete on 
the women's basketball team at a community college in California was 
criticized on nationally-syndicated sports radio program because of her age and 
4natal sex. Students at a high school in Mississippi staged a protest of the 
school's decision to permit a transgender student to wear clothing appropriate 
for her affirmed gender, a violation of the dress code in these students' minds. 
These examples, all taken from news reports from a three-month period in early 
2013, are stories that reveal just the surface of the problem. For every story of 
discrimination that's reported, there are likely countless others that are not.6 
While it's clear that transgender students are harassed, excluded, and 
otherwise the victims of discrimination, what is less clear is the extent to which 
this discrimination is prohibited by law. Title IX, the federal law prohibiting 
discrimination "on the basis of sex" in federally-funded schools, does not 
expressly prohibit discrimination against transgender students. Yet it is 
1. Dan Frosch, Dispute on TransgenderRights Unfolds at a ColoradoSchool, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2013. 
2. Natalie DiBlasio, Smith CollegeRejects Transgender Applicant, USA TODAY (Mar. 
22, 2013, 11:37 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/22/smith­
college-transgender-rejected/2009047/. 
3. Expelled Transgender Student Sues CahforniaBaptist University, SAN DIEGO GAY 
& LESBIAN NEWS (Mar. 1, 2013), http://sdgln.com/news/2013/03/01/expelled-transgender­
student-suing-california-baptist-university. 
4. Erin Buzuvis, Transgender Athlete in Women's Locker Room Sparks 
Criticism.. .Inclusion and Respect, LGBT ISSUES IN SPORT BLOG (Jan. 2, 2013), 
http://stream.goodwin.drexel.edu/lgbtsportresearchnet/?p=863. 
5. Justin Hanson, Students ProtestOver TransgenderStudent's 'Special Treatment,' 
WMC-TV (Feb. 27, 2013 5:56 PM), http://www.wdam.com/story/21415682/students­
accuse-school-of-discrimination. 
6. EMILY A. GREYTAK, ET AL., HARSH REALMES: THE EXPERIENCES OF TRANSGENDER 
YOUTH IN OUR NATION'S SCHOOLS x-xi (2009), 
http://glsen.customer.def6.com/sites/default/files/Harsh%20Realities.pdf (reporting that 90% 
of transgender students reported hearing disparaging remarks, including from teachers and 
staff, 55% reported being physically harassed, and 28% physically assaulted). 
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). 
8. Id 
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possible to interpret the prohibition on sex discrimination in a number of 
different ways that would make the law available to transgender plaintiffs in 
some, many, or all cases of discrimination otherwise covered by the statute. 
Since Title IX has only been invoked in a handful of transgender rights cases, 
litigants must reference judicial decisions interpreting the sex-discrimination 
prohibition in Title IX's employment discrimination analog, Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.9 For example, in a line of cases going back to the 
Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, courts have 
interpreted statutes that prohibit sex discrimination to include discrimination on 
the basis gender nonconformity.'o More recently, however, a lower federal 
court interpreted sex discrimination in the employment context to include 
discrimination based on the change of one's sex; and the federal agency that 
enforces federal employment discrimination law interpreted sex discrimination 
to include discrimination based on gender identity." All of these interpretations 
have the potential to assist transgender plaintiffs in at least some circumstances. 
This article will identify and evaluate these various interpretations with a goal 
toward maximizing the statute's potential to protect transgender plaintiffs, 
particularly students who, unlike teachers and staff, do not otherwise enjoy 
protection under civil rights laws protecting discrimination in employment.12 
In pursuit of this goal, it is important to acknowledge that Title IX is not 
the only potential source of legal remedies to transgender students who have 
endured discrimination. A growing number of states include gender identity in 
the list of categories protected by their nondiscrimination statutes that apply to 
education, offering more direct, express protection for transgender students 
than Title IX itself.'3 Yet these protections only exist in fifteen states plus the 
District of Columbia, and the protection in three of these states only cover 
elementary and secondary education, excluding college and graduate school.14 
Another potential source of protection for transgender students is the proposed 
federal Student Nondiscrimination Act, which has been introduced, 
unsuccessfully so far, in the previous two congressional terms.' 5 This bill seeks 
to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity (as well as sexual 
orientation) in schools across the country.'6 But versions of the bill proposed so 
9. Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against "any individual with 
respect to. .. compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's ... sex ..... 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
10. See infra Part II.B. 
11. See infra Part II.C. 
12. Title IX protects school employees from sex discrimination as well. This article 
will focus on students' rights, however, because employees enjoy commensurate protection 
under Title VII, while students do not. 
13. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-15c (West 2011); MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
76, § 5 (West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT ANN. § 233.010 (West 2011). 
14. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-15c (West 2011); NEV. REV. STAT ANN. § 233.010 
(West 2011). 
15. H.R. 998, 1 12 th Cong. (2011); S. 555, 1 12 th Cong. (2011); H.R. 4530, 1 11 th Cong. 
(2010). 
16. S. 555, 1 12 th Cong. 
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far all include conflicting language that could be read to limit at least some of 
the law's protections to students at public elementary and secondary schools." 
Title IX, in contrast, applies to educational institutions of every level that 
receive some federal funding.' 8 Therefore, in addition to political advocacy 
aimed at passing the Student Nondiscrimination Act and expanding protections 
available under state laws, 9 advocates must fully leverage Title IX's potential 
as well. 
This article will first provide a brief overview of Title IX, including, 
primarily, a general discussion of the statute's scope. Part II will examine 
judicial and regulatory decisions interpreting sex discrimination for purposes of 
Title VII, while Part III will describe the handful of cases to date in which 
courts have considered Title IX's applicability to cases involving transgender 
plaintiffs. Finally, Part IV looks ahead, envisioning Title IX's application to 
transgender discrimination contexts that haven't yet been considered by the 
courts. Part IV will also demonstrate that a number of interpretations support 
Title IX as a source of legal rights for transgender plaintiffs in contexts like 
harassment, admissions, and expulsion, while plaintiffs challenging 
discrimination in those aspects of education that are lawfully segregated by sex 
can benefit from recent and emerging interpretations of sex discrimination 
borrowed from the Title VII context. 
17. The Student Nondiscrimination Act has been described, even by its sponsors, as 
seeking to "establish[] a comprehensive federal prohibition against discrimination and 
bullying in public schools based on sexual orientation or gender identity." Student Non-
Discrimination Act, AL FRANKEN: U.S. SENATOR FOR MINNESOTA, 
http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=issue&id=212. The bill's primary provision, on the other 
hand, is written broadly to apply, like Title IX, to all federally funded educational 
institutions. See Student Non-Discrimination Act, S. 555, 112th Cong. § 4(a) ("No student 
shall, on the basis of actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity of such 
individual or of a person with whom the student associates or has associated, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.) (emphasis added). Yet other 
provisions, read together, raise the possibility that the drafters understand its scope to be 
limited to public elementary and secondary schools. See id. § 4(b) ("For purposes of this 
Act, discrimination includes harassmentof a student on the basis of actual or perceived 
sexual orientation or gender identity of such student or of a person with whom the student 
associates or has associated.") (emphasis added); id. § 3 ("The term 'harassment' means 
conduct that is sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive to limit a student's ability to 
participate in or benefit from a program or activity of a public school or educational 
agency. . . .") (emphasis added); id. § 3(a)(5) ("The term 'public school' means an 
elementary school .... that is a public institution, and a secondary school .... that is a 
public institution.")(emphasis added). 
18. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). 
19. After all, Title IX has limitations of its own that could leave some transgender 
plaintiffs looking for remedies under state law. For example, Title IX does not apply to 
private undergraduate admissions, and thus would be unhelpful in instances like the Smith 
College example described above. 
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF TITLE IX 
Just over forty years ago, Congress passed and President Nixon signed an 
omnibus education bill called The Education Amendment Acts of 1972, which 
contained the following provision, known as Title IX: 
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance .... 
Though this provision was primarily aimed at eliminating discrimination 
against women in college admissions and faculty hiring,2 1 the law defines the 
statute's application broadly to address all levels of education, including "any 
public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any institution 
of vocational, professional, or higher education. ... But despite the statute's 
breadth in this regard, Title IX also contains a number of exclusions and 
exemptions, which this Part will discuss in detail. It will also describe how 
Congress and the courts resolved other questions regarding the law's scope not 
addressed directly by the statute's terms; namely, Title IX's application to 
programs that are not themselves in direct receipt of federal funds, employment 
practices, and sexual harassment. Last, this section will address the ways in 
which Title IX permits educational institutions to segregate certain aspects by 
sex, including dormitories and facilities, athletics programs, and certain classes 
in elementary and secondary education. 
A. 	 Title IX ContainsStatutoryExemptionsforPrivateUndergraduate 
Admissions PracticesandOther Programs 
Title IX applies to college admissions, but the statute contains two express 
limitations in this regard. First, it excludes the admissions practices of private 
undergraduate institutions. 23 This limitation reflects the political influence of 
private colleges, many of whom were either not yet admitting women, or only 
admitting women subject to a limiting quota, at the time Title IX was being 
considered.24 During floor debates on the proposed versions of Title IX, 
20. 	 § 1681(a). 
21. H.R. REP. No. 92-554 at 1; Education Amendments of 1972 P.L. 92-318, 86 Stat. 
235 (describing congressional testimony about discriminatory practices in admissions and 
hiring); Bernice R. Sandler, "Too Strongfor a Woman" - The Five Words that Created Title 
IX, in TITLE IX: A BRIEF HISTORY WTH DOCUMENTs 35, 35. 
22. 	 § 1681(c). 
23. Id. § 1681(a)(1) ("[I]n regard to admission to educational institutions, this section 
shall apply only to institutions of vocational education, professional education, and graduate 
higher education, and to public institutions of undergraduate higher education .... ). 
24. E.g., 117 CONG. REC. 38639-42 (Nov. 1, 1971) (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn) 
(including letters from Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Dartmouth, Smith, and the Association of 
American Universities, objecting to Congress's inclusion ofundergraduate admissions in the 
nondiscrimination mandate). These arguments included concerns about the greater costs 
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Members of Congress spoke in favor of excluding undergraduate 25 admission 
in order to ensure that colleges would not be liable for sex discrimination as 
they transitioned towards equality.26 Others spoke of the need to preserve 
institutions' "free[dom] to experiment with varying ratios of men and women 
on the campus" 27 and objected to the possible federal intrusion into the "right to 
determine the composition of their own student bodies. ...,,28 The House of 
Representatives amended the bill to exclude all undergraduate admissions from 
the nondiscrimination mandate, but this broad exception had to be reconciled 
with the Senate's narrower exception during the conference. 29 As a result, the 
version of Title IX that was ultimately signed into law excludes private 
undergraduate admissions.30 
This same floor debate also gave rise to Title IX's second limitation with 
respect to admissions-an expressed exclusion of the admissions practices of 
any single-sex public undergraduate institution that "traditionally and 
continually from its establishment has had a policy of admitting only students 
of one sex."3 The exemption for public undergraduate admissions applied to 
such institutions as the Mississippi University for Women and the Virginia 
Military Institute; however, the single-sex practices of both institutions were 
subsequently found to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14 th 
Amendment.32 As a result of these decisions, Title IX's exemption for single-
sex public institutions is effectively moot. The last public single-sex 
undergraduate institution was Douglass College (formerly New Jersey College 
for Women) which merged with Rutgers in 2007. 
institutions would incur by adding an equal number of women to student bodies that were 
predominantly male, that increasing the number of female undergraduates would require 
institutions to redistribute faculty from the sciences to the humanities, and that having more 
female students would ultimately diminish alumni contributions. Id. 
25. The House version of the bill containing the provision that would become Title IX 
contained an exemption for undergraduate admissions, while the Senate version excluded 
only private undergraduate admission as well as public institutions with a single-sex 
tradition. The Senate's version prevailed in the conference report. 
26. E.g., 117 CONG. REc. 39253-54 (Nov. 4, 1971) (Statement of Rep. Conte) 
(supporting an exception for undergraduate admissions, on behalf of private colleges like 
Williams and Amherst, who were by that time co-ed, but still low enrollment of women that 
could have appeared to be discriminatory under a law prohibiting sex discrimination in 
admissions); id. at 39254 (statement of Rep. Wyman) (supporting the amendment on behalf 
of Dartmouth College). 
27. Id. at 39252 (statement of Rep. Peyser). 
28. Id. at 39249 (statement of Rep. Erlenborn) (calling such intrusion "the seed of 
destruction for our system of higher education as we know it."). 
29. See Sen. Conf. Rep. No. 92-798, at 221 (1972). 
30. Id. 
31. 20 U.S.C.§ 1681(a)(5) (2012). It also contained a now-outdated grace period for 
the admissions practices of institutions that were in the process of transitioning from a 
single-sex institution to a coeducation one. Id. § 1681(a)(2). 
32. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. 
Hogan,458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
33. Douglas Residential College, WIKIPEDIA (Sept. 4, 2013), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilDouglassResidentialCollege; Women's Colleges in the United 
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In addition to the statute's limitations regarding admissions, Title IX also 
includes a number of other expressed exemptions, including those for 
institutions whose primary purpose is to train individuals for the military of the 
United States, 4 social fraternities and sororities and voluntary youth service 
organizations,3 boys and girls conferences, 36 father/daughter and mother/son 
activities3 7 and beauty pageant awards.3 ' The statute also provides an 
exemption for religious institutions that demonstrate that Title IX is not 
consistent with the religious tenets of their organization." The exemption, 
however, does not apply to the entire institution, but only those practices of the 
institution that are in fact in conflict with Title IX.4 
B. 	 Title IX's Scope Includes ProgramsNot Directly Receiving Federal 
Funds,Employment, Harassment 
Today, it is clear that Title IX applies to all aspects of an institution that 
receives federal funds, but the law has not always been interpreted so broadly. 
After Title IX took effect in 1972, some educational institutions argued that the 
law's reach was limited only to programs that directly received federal funds.41 
In 1984, the Supreme Court endorsed this position in a case involving Grove 
City College, a private Christian college whose only contact using federal funds 
was its students' participation in federal financial student aid programs.42 The 
Court held that Grove City College's admissions program was subject to Title 
IX as a result of that federal money, but its reasoning made clear that other 
aspects of the College that did not have a direct nexus with federal funds were 
outside the scope of the law.43 Though Grove City College's case was not about 
athletics, the Court's reasoning rendered Title IX inapplicable to college and 
university athletic departments which do not directly receive federal funds." 
Congress nullified this decision, however, when it passed the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 1987, amending Title IX to provide its application to "all 
States, WIKIPEDIA (Oct. 7, 2013), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s-collegesin the UnitedStates. 
34. § 1681(a)(4). The U.S. service academies, state and private military academies, 
now all admit women, so this exemption is moot to some extent. However, this exemption is 
not limited to admissions. As a result, service academies could argue that claims of sex 
discrimination outside the context of admissions, such as sexual harassment, are outside the 
scope ofTitle IX. 
35. 	 Id. § 1681(a)(6). 
36. 	 Id. § 1681(a)(7) 
37. 	 Id. § 1681(a)(8). 
38. 	 Id. § 1681(a)(9). 
39. 	 Id. § 1681(a)(3); 
40. 	 See, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3); 34 C.F.R. § 106.12(a) (2013). 
41. 	 See Univ. of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 322 (E.D. Va. 1982); Othen v. 
Ann Arbor Sch. Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Grove City Coll.v. Harris, 
500 F. Supp. 253, 255 (W.D. Pa. 1980). 
42. 	 Grove City Coll.v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). 
43. 	 Id. at 573-74. 
44. 	 Id. 
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operations" of an educational institution, "any part of which is extended 
[f]ederal financial assistance . .. ."4' As a result, Title IX applies, subject to the 
exclusions and exemptions discussed elsewhere in Part I, to all public 
elementary and secondary educations and even some private K-12 programs, 
who receive federal grants for classroom initiatives, educational technology, or 
subsidies for school lunch programs. As for colleges and universities, virtually 
all of them, public and private, participate in federal financial student aid 
programs,46 ensuring that all of their programs and activities must comply with 
Title IX unless otherwise excluded or exempt. 
Other questions of Title IX's scope have also been clarified by Supreme 
Court decisions. In North Haven BoardofEducation v. Bell, the Court clarified 
that when Congress said "no person" shall be subject to discrimination based 
on sex in federally -funded educational programs, it meant to include 
employees as well as students,47 thus establishing Title IX's application to 
employment practices of educational institutions otherwise subject to the law. 
The Supreme Court has also confirmed that Title IX is enforceable not only by 
the Department of Education, but also through lawsuits by private individuals,48 
including lawsuits seeking money damages.49 Additionally, the Court has 
confirmed that discrimination prohibited by the statute can include sexual 
harassment if school officials had notice of ongoing harassment or a threat 
thereof and responded to that information with deliberate indifference.50 
C. 	 Title IXAllows Segregationby Sex in Athletics, Facilities,andK-12 
Classes 
In most contexts to which it applies, Title IX's nondiscrimination mandate 
requires institutions to provide equal opportunity to students and employees of 
each sex. For example, the regulatory interpretation of Title IX's application to 
admissions prohibits preferences or numerical limitations based on sex, 
requiring applicants to be judged neutrally in that regard." However, Title IX 
adopts a separate-but-equal approach to certain aspects of education. For one 
thing, the Department of Education's implementing regulations clarify that 
Title IX allows colleges and universities to provide separate dormitories, locker 
rooms, toilets, and shower facilities to each sex, so long as separate facilities 
45. 	 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2012). 
46. One notable exception being Grove City College itself, who withdrew from 
participation in federal financial aid programs in order to preserve its institutional 
independence from Title IX and other civil rights laws similarly conditioned on federal 
funding. About: Grove City College, GROVE CITY COLLEGE, 
http://www.gec.edulabout/Pages/About.aspx. 
47. 456 U.S. 512 (1982); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.51-106.61 (2013) (provisions of 
Title IX's implementing regulations governing employment practices). 
48. 	 Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 677 (1979). 
49. 	 Franklinv. Gwinnettt Cnty. Pub.Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 60 (1992). 
50. 	 Davisv. Monroe Cnty. Bd ofEduc., 526 U.S. 629, 629 (1999). 
51. 	 34 C.F.R. § 106.21(b) (2013). 
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are of comparable quality and proportionate in quantity.52 The regulations also 
allow schools to provide separate athletics opportunities to students of each 
sex,53 again, subject to requirements that separate programs be equivalent in 
terms of the number of opportunities available to each sex, as well as overall 
quality.54 
Educational institutions may offer certain classes separately to members 
of each sex, including human sexuality classes, physical education classes that 
involve in contact sports, and chorus.s Additionally, the Department of 
Education adopted regulatory provisions in 2006 which expand opportunities 
for elementary and secondary schools to offer single-sex classes.16 Such classes 
must either exist as part of an overall policy to provide diverse educational 
opportunities, or in order to address "particular, identified needs of its 
students. Additionally, such programs must be voluntary, and must not 
supplant coeducation opportunities in the same subject or activity. 8 Since this 
regulation took effect, the number of public single-sex education classes has 
increased considerably. 9 Nevertheless, they remain controversial, as many 
have been challenged for violating these regulatory requirements and for 
employing generalizations and stereotypes about sex in an unconstitutional 
60 manner.
52. Id. §§ 106.32-106.33. 
53. Id. § 106.41(b) ("[A] recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for 
members of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the 
activity involved is a contact sport."). The regulation does require, however, that when an 
institution offers a particular sport only for one sex, it allow members of the other sex the 
opportunity to try out in certain circumstances, i.e., (1) the student seeking the opportunity to 
try out must be a members of the sex whose athletic opportunities have previously been 
limited; and (2) the sport involved is a contact sport like boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice 
hockey, football, basketball, or other sports the purpose or major activity of which involves 
bodily contact. Id. 
54. Id. § 106.41(c). 
55. Id. § 106.34(a). 
56. Dep't. of Educ., 71 Fed. Reg. 62530-32 (Oct. 25, 2006) (to be codified at 34 
C.F.R. pt. 106). 
57. § 106.34(b). 
58. Id. 
59. The National Association for Single-Sex Public Education reports that in the 
2011-12 school year, 506 public elementary and secondary schools had some form of single 
sex education; 116 were entirely or mostly single sex while 390 were co-ed schools that 
segregated by sex for certain classes. Single-Sex Schools/Schools with Single-Sex 
Classrooms/What's the Difference?, NAT'L ASS'N FOR SINGLE SEX PUB. EDUC., 
http://www.singlesexschools.org/schools-schools.htm. 
60. Doe v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd, No. 10-30378, 2011 WL 1290793, at *368,
*377 (5th Cir. Apr. 6, 2011) (remanding case to district court for full consideration of 
plaintiffs' claims that single sex education program violated Title IX and the Equal 
Protection Clause); Doe v. Wood Cnty. Bd ofEduc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 771 (S.D.W. Va. 2012) 
(enjoining single-sex classes that were not completely voluntary). See also Teach Kids, Not 
Stereotypes, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 28, 2013),
http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/teach-kids-not-stereotypes (describing the ACLU's 
efforts to challenge single-sex education that does not comply with Title IX). 
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D. Conclusion 
Many specific questions regarding Title IX are answered in the statutory 
text, by judicial opinion, and by the statute's implementing regulations. Yet 
none of these sources of law definitively address the question at the heart of 
any attempt to apply Title IX to transgender students. What does it mean to 
discriminate based on sex, and how does that concept apply to someone who 
self-identifies in terms of gender in a manner that is incongruous with the sex 
that individual was assigned at birth? 
It is clear that Congress did not consider questions of how Title IX would 
apply to transgender students and institutional employees when it passed Title 
IX in 1972, or when the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (the 
Department of Education's predecessor) promulgated Title IX's initial 
implementing regulations in 1975. It is not surprising that transgender issues 
were not on lawmakers' collective radar. Litigation seeking relief for 
transgender plaintiffs in the analogous context of employment was only 
beginning to occur at that point in time6' and public attention had not yet 
focused on transgender athletes the way it would after Renee Richards' high-
profile lawsuit challenging her exclusion from the 1976 U.S. Women's tennis 
open.62 Over the last several decades, courts in the employment context have 
been called upon to consider how statutory prohibitions against sex 
discrimination apply to transgender plaintiffs, and it is to these interpretations 
this Article now turns. 
II. TITLE VII CASES DEFINING DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEX 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal employment 
discrimination statute, prohibits an employer from refusing to hire, firing, or 
otherwise discriminating against any individual "because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."6 Congress did not define "sex" in 
this context either, nor did it leave a useful record suggesting how it may have 
interpreted the term. 4 Over the years, courts have struggled to provide a 
definition that would satisfactorily answer whether discrimination against 
transgender employees is sex discrimination under the law.6' As this Part will 
show, a variety of such interpretations has emerged, from early interpretations 
that restricted transgender plaintiffs' rights under Title VII, to very recent 
decisions that have broadened those rights significantly. 
61. Holloway v. ArthurAndersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 n.7 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing 
earlier cases from 1975 and 1976, and adopting a "traditional definition" of sex that denied 
transgender plaintiff relief under Title VII). 
62. Richardsv. U.S. Tennis Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Sup. Ct. 1977). 
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
64. See Shawn D. Twing & Timothy C. Williams, Title VII's TransgenderTrajectory: 
An Analysis of Whether TransgenderPeople Are a ProtectedClass Under the Term "Sex" 
and Practical Implications of Inclusion, 15 Tex. J. on C.L. & C.R. 173, 174 (2010) 
(describing how "sex" was inserted into Title VII legislation in the first place as a joke in an 
effort to get the bill defeated). 
65. See infra Part II(A)-(C) 
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A. EarlyDecisions: "Becauseof[biological]sex" 
In most early decisions involving transgender plaintiffs, courts reasoned 
that Congress meant for "sex" to mean biological sex, separate and apart from 
the sex (or more accurately, gender) one experiences oneself to be, an 
interpretation that resulted in courts denying Title VII protection to transgender 
plaintiffs.66 Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, a case in which an airline fired a pilot 
after discovering the pilot had sex reassignment surgery, is perhaps the most 
notorious of these cases.6 ' There, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
reasoned that Ulane's transition did not change her biological sex, in that it did 
not create a uterus and ovaries, or alter her male chromosomes.68 Therefore, 
since Ulane did not change her sex, the airline did not discriminate against her 
"because of sex."69 
While this judicial interpretation of "sex" was the one most commonly 
applied to early transgender plaintiffs, it was not an inevitable interpretation. 
Before being overruled by the Seventh Circuit, the federal district court in 
Ulane had ruled in the pilot's favor.70 After receiving testimony from medical 
experts, the judge was persuaded that one's "sex" consists of more than just 
one's chromosomes or reproductive anatomy, but includes "at least in part a 
question of self-perception and a societal perception . . . ."n Once the court 
accepted sex as a multi-faceted concept, whose constituents are not always 
necessarily in accord, the court easily concluded that discrimination "because 
2of sex" includes discrimination "because of transsexuality." 7 The judge 
bolstered this reasoning by analogizing to race discrimination, recognizing that 
race, too, has both biological and non-biological components that don't 
necessarily align. A Hispanic plaintiff who is white but who presents and 
perceives himself to be non-white is covered by race discrimination, just as a 
plaintiff who is biologically male but who presents and perceives herself to be 
female is covered by sex discrimination.74 Had the judge's conclusions been 
upheld on appeal instead of reversed, Title VII's application to transgender 
66. Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); 
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977); Powell v. 
Read's, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 371 (D. Md. 1977); Grossmanv. Bd of Educ., 11 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1196, 1199 (D.N.J. 1975) aff'd mem., 538 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1976); Voyles 
v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Ctr., 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975) aff'd mem., 570 F.2d 
354 (9th Cir. 1978). 
67. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). 
68. Id.at 1083. 
69. Id at 1087. 
70. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 821 (N.D. Ill. 1984), rev'd, 742 F.2d 
1081 (7th Cir. 1984). 
71. Id.at 823-24. 
72. Id.at 839-40. In the alternative, the judge would have let Ulane's case proceed on 
the theory that she was discriminated against because of her female sex. Id. 
73. Id. at 823-24 (citing Budinsky v. Corning Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786, 788 
(W.D. Pa. 1977 
74. Id. 
230 WISCONSIN JOURNAL OFLAW, GENDER &SOCIETY [Vol. 28:3 
plaintiffs-and by extension, Title IX's-might have been a much more 
straightforward proposition. 
B. "Becauseofsex". .. stereotypes 
The Supreme Court eventually rejected the view that Congress meant sex 
discrimination to only mean discrimination against one's biological sex." In 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court considered the case of Ann 
Hopkins, a female accountant who was passed over for promotion based at 
least in part on the partners' view that she was too aggressive for a woman. 
The Court recognized that because aggressiveness is a trait the partners require 
for promotion, their objections to Hopkins's aggressiveness placed her in an 
"intolerable and impermissible catch 22 . . . ." By agreeing that "Title VII lifts 
women out of this bind," the Court interpreted sex discrimination to include not 
just discrimination on one's sex in the sense of being "biologically" male or 
female, but also discrimination on the basis of how one presents one's gender 
relative to one's "biological" sex. 
Since Price Waterhouse, many lower courts have applied its holding to the 
benefit of plaintiffs claiming discrimination on the basis of their failure to 
conform to stereotypes about sex or gender.7 ' Though Price Waterhouse did 
not involve a transgender plaintiff, transgender plaintiffs are among those who 
have prevailed under this interpretation. For example, in Smith v. City of 
Salem,79 a city fire department tried to force an employee to resign after "he" 
(the court used plaintiffs birth-sex pronouns, perhaps to make the application 
of the sex stereotype theory more easily understood) began expressing his 
female gender identity in the workplace and expressed his intention to 
physically transition from male to female. Applying Price Waterhouse, a 
federal court of appeals determined that Smith's case was actionable under 
Title VII.80 Specifically, the court drew a parallel between an employer "who 
discriminates against women because, for instance, they do not wear dresses or 
makeup" and employers "who discriminate against men because they do wear 
dresses or makeup, or otherwise act femininely. ... If the former is an 
example of sex discrimination, as Price Waterhouse says, so too is the latter, 
75. Price Waterhousev. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
76. Id at 234-35. 
77. Id.at 251. 
78. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (gay male 
employee harassed by fellow employees due to failure to conform to gender stereotypes). 
But see Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 220-23 (2d Cir. 2005) (plaintiffs 
evidence was insufficient to show that she was discriminated against for her gender 
nonconforming appearance, rather than her sexual orientation); Jesperson v. Harrah's 
Operating Co. Inc., 392 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting that an employer's 
dress code, which required female employees to wear makeup, constituted a sex stereotype 
in violation of Title Vll). 
79. 378 F.3d 566, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2004). 
80. Id. at 572-73. 
81. Id.at 574 (first emphasis added). 
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and the fact that Smith's gender nonconformity could also be labeled 
transsexuality did not make the analogy to Price Waterhouse any less 
persuasive.8 2 Besides Smith v. City of Salem, other judicial opinions have 
similarly applied the reasoning of Price Waterhouse to extend Title VII's 
protections to transgender plaintiffs who have endured adverse employment 
action due to the employer's perception that they failed to conform to 
stereotypes in behavior and appearance that are consistent with the plaintiffs 
birth sex.83 As these cases demonstrate, gender nonconformity theory provides 
for the possibility of a work-around to the restrictive interpretation of sex 
presented by the Ulane line of cases. While not accepting a definition of sex 
that is broad enough to include transsexuality per se, these courts at least accept 
that a plaintiffs non-stereotypical presentation of one's biological sex can be 
the basis of protection, and have been able to fit transgender plaintiffs into this 
mold. 
C. 	 Because of[Changeoft Sex andBecause of TransgenderGender 
Identity 
In 2008, Schroer v. Billington, a lower federal court decision, marked a 
turning point for transgender plaintiffs by interpreting sex discrimination to 
include discrimination on the basis of one's transsexuality.84 The plaintiff in the 
case was Diane Schroer, a transgender woman who had applied for and was 
offered a job in the Library of Congress Congressional Research Service while 
she was still presenting as a male. Before starting the job, Schroer disclosed 
her transgender status and her intention to present fulltime as a woman and 
undergo a physical transition as well. Subsequently, the employer rescinded 
Schroer's job offer, claiming as the reason that it would be difficult for Schroer 
82. 	 Id. at 574-75. 
83. Vickers v. FairfieldMed. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 2006); Barnes v. City of 
Cincinnati,401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005); Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & DiagnosticGrp., 
Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 656, 660 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (transsexual male-to-female (MTF) 
plaintiff whose job offer was revoked after she came to the interview presenting as a 
woman); Schroerv. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 210-11 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Doe v. United 
Consumer Fin. Servs., No. 1:01 CV 1112, 2001 WL 34350174, at *3-4 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 
2001). See also Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (1lth Cir. 2011) (holding that 
discrimination against a transgender plaintiffs sex discrimination for purposes of applying 
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, noting that "[a] person is defined as 
transgender precisely because of the perception that his or her behavior transgresses gender 
stereotypes."). But see Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222-1225 (10th Cir. 
2007) (though transgender plaintiff alleged discrimination for failing to conform with 
stereotypes consistent with her birth sex, the defendant satisfied its burden of proving a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision; i.e., that plaintiffs desire to use 
public, women's bathrooms posed a risk of liability); Oiler v. Winn-DixieLa., Inc., No. Civ. 
A.00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *4-6 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002) (relying on pre-Price 
Waterhouse decision holding transgender plaintiffs were not protected by Title VII ban on 
discrimination because of sex). 
84. 	 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
85. 	 Id.at 295. 
86. 	 Id at 296. 
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to obtain the necessary security clearance for the job.87 Schroer sued, and after 
conducting a bench trial, the court ruled in her favor, on two alternative 
grounds." First, applying Price Waterhouse, the court concluded that the 
employer discriminated against Schroer on the basis of gender nonconformity. 89 
Schroer had produced sufficient evidence to suggest that the hiring decision 
maker rescinded the job offer because she was uncomfortable about the 
prospect of Schroer, whom she had come to know as a man, would be wearing 
a dress and presenting as a woman.90 
Next, the court reasoned that, separate and apart from sex stereotyping, 
refusing to hire someone who changes their sex targets that person because of 
sex.91 It is therefore sex discrimination in the same sense that refusing to hire 
someone because they have converted from one religion to another is 
discrimination on the basis of religion. 92 This reasoning offers broader 
protection for transgender plaintiffs than the sex stereotyping rationale; after 
all, it would have been available to Schroer even if the job offer had been 
revoked under circumstances that didn't evoke discrimination on the basis of 
gender nonconformity-for example, if Schroer had not been able to prove that 
her prospective employer thought of her as a "man in a dress" and was 
uncomfortable about that. Moreover, it avoids the awkward fit that comes from 
having to conceive of a plaintiff like Schroer as a gender nonconforming man 
in order to find in her favor. Finally, by sidestepping the inquiry into what 
Congress meant by sex, this reasoning avoids a collision course with the Ulane 
line of cases, and is therefore potentially available in jurisdictions where those 
cases are still good law. 
87. Id. at 299. 
88. Id. at 300. 
89. Id. at 303-06. 
90. Schroerv. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305 (D.D. Cir. 2008). The judge in this 
case had, in an earlier decision, acknowledged the apparent awkwardness of framing of 
Schroer's as a gender nonconformity case: 
Schroer is not seeking acceptance as a man with feminine traits. She seeks to 
express her female identity, not as an effeminate male, but as a woman. She does 
not wish to go against the gender grain, but with it. She has embraced the 
cultural mores dictating that "Diane" is a female name and that women wear 
feminine attire. The problem she faces is not because she does not conform to 
the Library's stereotypes about how men and women should look and behave-
she adopts those norms. Rather, her problems stem from the Library's 
intolerance toward a person like her, whose gender identity does not match her 
anatomical sex. Id. at 210-11 (the court went on to deny the Library's motion to 
dismiss anyway). 
91. Id. at 306-08. 
92. Id. at 306-07. 
93. Id. at 308 ("Even if the decisions that define the word 'sex" in Title VII as 
referring only to anatomical or chromosomal sex are still good law-after that approach 'has 
been eviscerated by Price Waterhouse'-the Library's refusal to hire Schroer after being 
advised that she planned to change her anatomical sex by undergoing sex reassignment 
surgery was literallydiscrimination 'because of... sex."') (quoting Smith v. City ofSalem, 
378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
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Last year, an even broader interpretation of "because of sex" appeared in a 
decision of the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, the federal 
agency that enforces Title VII and through which potential plaintiffs must first 
seek administrative relief before they may sue in federal court.94 Mia Macy, a 
transgender woman, was still presenting as a man when she applied for a 
position with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms crime laboratory 
in Walnut Creek, California.95 After interviewing Macy, the lab director 
indicated that Macy would be hired if she cleared the background check. Soon 
after that, Macy disclosed to the Director that she was in the process of 
transitioning from male to female. 97 Suddenly, the job was no longer 
available.98 Macy filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), which initially declined to process Macy's case as a case 
about discrimination on the basis of "gender identity, change of sex, and/or 
transgender status," but changed its position after Macy's intra-agency appeal. 99 
Relying on Price Waterhouse and other precedent involving sex stereotyping 
claims, the EEOC reasoned that sex, as used in Title VII, encompasses both sex 
and gender. 00 Therefore, sex discrimination incorporates discrimination on the 
basis of someone's transgender status, as such discrimination is directed at the 
gender that individual performs relative to that individual's "biological," or 
assigned, sex. In total, the EEOC endorsed the broadest possible definition of 
sex discrimination: one that incorporates discrimination on the basis of 
biological sex, discrimination on the grounds of gender nonconformity (Price 
Waterhouse), discrimination on the basis of change of sex (Schroer), and 
discrimination on the basis of gender identity and transgender status (directly 
contra Ulane). 
III. TITLE VII'S INFLUENCE ON TITLE IX CASES To DATE 
Of all of the Title VII precedent interpreting "because of sex," the Price 
Waterhouse gender nonconformity interpretation is the one to have already 
proven influential in Title IX cases. The vast majority of these cases have 
involved non-transgender plaintiffs. For example, in Montgomery v. 
Independent School District No. 709, the plaintiff was a male high school 
student who had been verbally and physically tormented by his classmates 
throughout eleven years of public education.'o The harassing students 








100. Macy v. Holder, EEOC DOC 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (Apr. 20, 2012), 
available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120120821*%2OMacy/ 20v/2ODOJ%20ATF.txt. 
101. 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1083-84 (D. Minn. 2000). 
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routinely calling the victim a girl and by a girl's name suggested to the court 
that the plaintiff was targeted for being insufficiently masculine in his 
appearance and behavior, making his case one of gender nonconformity.102 
Even though the plaintiff was also targeted for his perceived sexual orientation, 
the extent to which this harassment took the form of targeting his gender 
presentation is what gave him a right to relief under Title IX. Since 
Montgomery, many plaintiffs, both male and female have prevailed in 
103 harassment cases by invoking Price Waterhouse. Even in cases where 
plaintiffs' cases were dismissed, such outcomes were due to insufficient 
evidence that gender nonconformity motivated the harassment, not a 
disagreement about whether "because of sex" incorporates gender 
nonconformity as a matter of law.104 
Outside the courts, federal agencies with enforcement authority over Title 
IX have also interpreted discrimination "because of sex" to include 
discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity. In 2010, the Justice 
Department sought to intervene in Title IX litigation on behalf of the plaintiff, a 
male student who was bullied and harassed by his peers because he "engages in 
physical expressions that are stereotypically female, e.g., swinging his hips and 
singing in a high pitched voice."05 The case settled before the Justice 
Department could brief the issue, but the agency's effort to take the plaintiff's 
side demonstrates the government's approval of interpreting Title IX to apply 
in cases involving discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity. Later 
that year, the Department of Education issued a "Dear Colleague Letter" to 
clarify school districts' obligations under Title IX to address peer 
harassment.'06 Among other points, the letter explained that while Title IX does 
not expressly cover discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender 
identity, it does protect all students, including gay, lesbian, bisexual, and 
transgender students, who experience sex- or gender-based harassment.o As 
an example, the letter describes a hypothetical non-transgender gay male 
student who was ridiculed because his effeminate behavior and mannerisms 
102. Id. at 1090-93. 
103. Patterson v. Hudson Area Sch., 551 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2009); Doe v. Brimfield 
Grade Sch., 552 F. Supp. 2d 816 (C.D. Ill. 2008); Riccio v. New Haven Bd ofEduc, 467 F. 
Supp. 2d 219 (D. Conn. 2006); Theno v. Tonganoxie UnifiedSch. Dist No. 464, 377 F. Supp. 
2d 952 (D. Kan. 2005). 
104. E.g., Wolfe v. Fayetteville, Ark. Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 860, 861, 867 (8th Cir. 
2011); A.E. ex rel. Evans v. HarrisburgSch. Dist. No. 7, No. 6:1 1-CV-6255-TC, 2012 WL 
4794314 (D. Or. Oct. 9, 2012); Estate of Carmichaelv. Galbraith,No. 3:11-CV-0622-D, 
2012 WL 4442413 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2012); Hoffman v. Saginaw Pub. Sch., No. 12­
10354, 2012 WL 2450805 (E.D. Mich. June 27, 2012). 
105. J.L. v. Mohawk Cent. Sch. Dist. 6:09 Cv. 943 (N.D.N.Y.) (U.S. Department of 
Justice motion for leave to intervene), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/mohawkmotion.pdf. 
106. Dear Colleague Letter from Russlynn Ali, Department of Education Assistant 
Secretary for Civil Rights, Oct. 26, 2010, available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201010.pdf 
107. Id. 
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and his preference for certain activities like drama club over sports.'"8 The 
Department confirmed that a school district in such a case is obligated to 
respond to such harassment, taking such steps as reasonably necessary to 
prevent its recurrence and address its affects. 
The gender nonconformity theory of Price Waterhouse has thus become 
of fixture in harassment cases, suggesting this interpretation is available to 
transgender plaintiffs in Title IX cases as well. After all, harassment is a form 
of discrimination that is familiar to both employment and education contexts, 
so it is natural that precedent defining "because of sex" in one context would 
apply in the other. There is also a strong similarity between the type of 
harassment experienced by the gay and lesbian Title IX plaintiffs who have 
prevailed on this theory and the type of harassment transgender plaintiffs would 
likely challenge under the law. 
Given this seemingly good fit, it is interesting to note that in the one 
reported Title IX harassment case that actually involved a transgender plaintiff, 
the gender nonconformity theory was nowhere to be seen. In Miles v. New York 
University,'0 9 the court accepted Title IX's applicability because the plaintiff, a 
student victim of sexual harassment, had been "perceived as female" by the 
offending professor.o Save for one very recent state superior court decision, in 
which the court considered the applicability of Title IX to the plaintiffs 
harassment claims without even analyzing whether harassment was "because of 
sex,""' no other reported Title IX harassment decisions have addressed 
plaintiffs who were identified as transgender. 
At the same time, the gender nonconformity theory did make an 
appearance in the only other reported Title IX/transgender case, where it was of 
questionable relevance. In Kastl v. Maricopa County Community College 
District, a community college prohibited a transgender instructor from using 
the women's restroom during her transition.' 12 In a point that contradicted the 
lower court's reasoning, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that 
Kastl had established a prima face of sex discrimination, based on a reading of 
Title IX that incorporated discrimination on the basis of gender conformity."' 
In the end, though, the court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case 
because it was persuaded by the college's evidence that the bathroom 
assignment was in fact motivated by concerns about safety instead.' 14 The 
court's one-page opinion gives rise to several unanswered questions about its 
reasoning. For one thing, if the court really was concerned about stereotypes 
about sex and gender, why didn't it recognize that the college's ostensible and 
108. Id. 
109. 979 F.Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
110. Id.at 249-50. 
111. Doe v. Clenchy, Penobscot Super. Ct, Nov. 20, 2012 (order granting summary 
judgment). 
112. Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 F. App'x 492, 493 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
113. Id. 
114. Id.at 494. 
236 WISCONSIN JOURNAL OFLAW GENDER & SOCIETY [Vol. 28:3 
vaguely-described concerns about "safety" traded in gender and transgender 
stereotypes as well? Relatedly, why did the court allow the college to offer a 
non-discriminatory justification in the first place? To accommodate the fact that 
most discrimination in the employment context is not discriminatory on its 
face, courts will allow plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case for 
discrimination based on circumstantial evidence. In such cases, the defendant 
can nevertheless prevail by offering a plausible nondiscriminatory justification 
for its action that is not pretext for unlawful discrimination."' But a case like 
Kastl's did not involve circumstantial evidence of discrimination. She was 
banned from the women's restroom explicitly because of her "sex"-whether 
that means her biological sex or transgender status. Therefore, the court should 
not have considered the college's ostensibly nondiscriminatory, alternative 
explanation.1 16 
Finally, the court's terse analysis does not answer the question of exactly 
why Kastl's case was one involving gender nonconformity. After all, the 
college was not excluding Kastl from the men's room because Kastl did not 
dress and act like a stereotypical male. Instead, it was treating her differently 
from other women based on the priority it assigned to her "biological" male 
sex. It is possible the court viewed Kastl as a gender nonconforming woman, in 
the sense that her anatomy, chromosomes, and birth sex assignment defy 
stereotypes about the anatomy, chromosomes, and birth sex assignment women 
typically have. But if the court was viewing Kastl that way, it would have been 
applying Price Waterhouse in a new and unique way---one that bears more 
explanation than what the court provided. In its brevity, the court's decision in 
Kastl offers very little substance to help us understand how courts should or 
will apply Title IX in cases involving transgender plaintiffs. 
IV. 	 TITLE IX's APPLICATION TO TRANSGENDER PLAINTIFFS GOING 
FORWARD 
Title IX cases involving transgender plaintiffs are, so far, rare, raising the 
question of how the law would apply to transgender cases in contexts not yet 
litigated. On top of that, recent developments in Title VII cases involving 
transgender plaintiffs provide additional new arguments that litigants can seek 
to apply in Title IX cases. This Part seeks to apply both existing and new 
interpretations of sex under Title VII to answer open questions about Title IX's 
application to transgender discrimination in the context of harassment, 
admissions and expulsion, and exclusion from lawfully sex-segregated contexts 
of education such as dormitories, bathrooms, and athletic teams. 
115. McDonnell-DouglasCorp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
116. "[T]he McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct 
evidence of discrimination." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U .S. 111, 121 
(1985). 
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A. HarassmentCases 
If a transgender plaintiff brought a Title IX case against an educational 
institution stemming from peer or teacher harassment, the gender 
nonconformity theory of Price Waterhouse would be the case's strongest legal 
ground for argument that harassment is "because of sex." After all, this theory 
was employed favorably towards transgender plaintiffs in the employment 
context, as well as by nontransgender plaintiffs in the education context, as 
discussed above. Based on this precedent, a judge would likely be persuaded to 
view harassment of a transgender student as targeting the student's perceived 
failure to conform to the stereotypes associated with that student's natal sex.' 17 
Especially in cases where the harassing students have already come to know the 
student's natal sex, this perception of nonconformity is likely to be present, or 
at least easy for the judge to imagine."' 8 In fact, except for cases like Miles, 
where the plaintiff was not perceived as transgender, most harassment that 
targets a transgender student is likely to involve negative comments about the 
student's gender expression and appearance, which would likely demonstrate 
animus based on gender nonconformity. 
While the advantage of relying on the gender nonconformity theory is that 
it is tried and true, particularly in cases involving harassment, there are 
potential disadvantages and limitations to pursuing relief under this approach. 
For instance, there may be some cases of harassment in which there is evidence 
of transgender animus, but not evidence of animus towards the plaintiffs 
gender nonconformity." 9 In such cases the gender nonconformity approach 
would be of little use. There also may be cases in which the gender 
nonconformity theory may be useful, but undesirable to the plaintiff. Some 
view the gender nonconformity theory as undermining or erasing a transgender 
plaintiffs gender identity, as it would require a transgender woman, for 
example, to seek relief for discrimination against her as a gender 
nonconforming man.12 To be sure, the law does not technically require the 
117. Leena D. Phadke, Comment, When Women Aren't Women andMen Aren't Men: 
The Problem of TransgenderSex DiscriminationUnder Title IX, 54 U. KAN. L. REv. 837, 
845-46 (2006); Ilona M. Turner, Comment, Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender 
Employees and Title VII, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 561, 589-90 (2007). 
118. Schroerv. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306 (D.D.C. 2008). 
119. See Mary Kristen Kelly, (Trans)forming TraditionalInterpretationsof Title VII: 
"Because ofSex" and the TransgenderDilemma, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 219, 230 
(2010) (describing a case in which a transgender plaintiffs harassment claim was dismissed 
because the only evidence she was able to show was that her supervisor referred to her as a 
"he/she," which, while offensive, did not constitute evidence of the harasser's animus 
towards her gender nonconformity (citingMyers v. CuyahogaCnty., 182 F. App'x 510, 520 
(6th Cir. 2006)). 
120. Elizabeth M. Glazer & Zachary A. Kramer, TransitionalDiscrimination, 18 
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 651, 666 (2009) ("Our difficulty with the Smith case is that 
the court reduces Smith's transgender identity to little more than a fashion choice to wear 
women's clothing."); Kelly, supra note 119, at 230;Devi Rao, Gender Identity 
DiscriminationIs Sex Discrimination:Protecting TransgenderStudentsfrom Bullying and 
HarassmentUsing Title lX, 28 Wisc. J.L, GENDER, AND Soc'Y 245, 256 (2013). 
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plaintiff to claim that status, only that she was perceived that way by those who 
harassed her or responded indifferently to her harassment.12' Nevertheless, such 
a plaintiff might understandably be uncomfortable standing behind a complaint 
that fails to name the target of harassment for what is - her transgender status. 
Another negative consequence of the gender nonconformity theory is that in 
basing relief on the gender nonconformity, it validates gender stereotypes as 
such.122 To describe a person's behavior or appearance as gender 
nonconforming implies there is a "correct" gender for whatever behavior or 
appearance is at issue. This might not feel right to some transgender plaintiffs, 
particularly if their gender identity is outside the gender binary altogether. 
Given these limitations, the emerging theories on transgender 
discrimination as sex discrimination articulated in Macy and Schroer may offer 
alternative grounds for some transgender plaintiffs in cases involving 
harassment. A transgender student who is not harassed prior to transition, but is 
harassed during and after, could argue that such harassment was based on sex 
under the transitional theory of Schroerl23 although a transgender student who 
is not transitioning and whose genderqueer presentation is the basis for 
harassment might not have the evidentiary basis to pursue such a claim.124 Of 
course, the theory that sex discrimination includes transgender discrimination 
per se, as articulated in Macy, is the broadest theoretical approach, capable of 
including harassment targeted at a transgender student's gender nonconformity, 
transition, or the fact of their transgender identity. The only downside to that 
framing is that, so far, no court has yet endorsed the EEOC's very recent 
interpretation, raising uncertainty about the plaintiffs likelihood of success 
using such approach. While we would expect courts to defer to the EEOC's 
construction of sex in a Title VII case, the EEOC's decision in Macy will be 
influential on Title IX courts only to the extent it is persuasive. 
B. Admissions andExpulsion Cases 
Title VII case law favorable to transgender plaintiffs is also likely to be 
influential in other Title IX contexts, which, like harassment, have analogs in 
employment. Admissions, for example, is analogous to hiring, while expulsion 
is analogous to firing. To work through this analogy, imagine a transgender 
student who is admitted to law school as a male but later begins to present as 
121. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1314 (11th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff claimed that 
employer "discriminat[ed] against her because of her sex, including her female gender 
identity and her failure to conform to the sex stereotypes associated with the sex Defendant[ 
perceived her to be."). 
122. Rao, supranote 120. Cf Judith Butler, AppearancesAside, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 55, 
62 (2000) ("Antidiscrimination law participates in the very practices it seeks to regulate; 
antidiscrimination law can become an instrument of discrimination in the sense that it must 
reiterate-and entrench-the stereotypical or discriminatory version of the social category it 
seeks to eliminate."). 
123. See Glazer & Kramer, supranote 120. 
124. Katrina McCann, Transsexuals and Title VII: Proposing an Interpretation of 
Schroerv.Billington, 25 Wis. J.L. GENDER & Soc'Y 163, 182 (2010). 
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female, in accordance with that student's female gender identity. If the law 
school expelled the student on these grounds, or otherwise took steps to make 
her want to drop out, the student's case would be highly analogous to Title VII 
cases like Smith, which involved constructive termination. The student could 
persuasively argue that she experienced discrimination on the basis of sex, on 
the grounds she was expelled because of her gender nonconformity. She could 
also argue, relying on Schroer, that she is being discriminated against on the 
basis of her transition 125 or that discrimination on the basis of her transgender 
gender identity is actionable sex discrimination, on the theory that the EEOC 
affirmed in Macy. 
Now imagine a case in which a transgender student who presents as 
female is rejected from graduate school when admissions discovers that she had 
been assigned a male sex at birth. Such a case is less likely to involve evidence 
that admissions discriminated against the student for failing to conform to 
stereotypical notions of masculinity, and more likely to involve discrimination 
on the basis of her change of sex, or transgender status per se. Title VII cases 
like Schroer and Macy, from the analogous context of hiring, will be useful to 
the plaintiff here. 
If a transgender student is rejected for admission to a private 
undergraduate program, however, Title IX is entirely unavailable as a source of 
legal protection, since the statute contains a categorical exclusion for the 
admissions practices of such institutions. 126 This would be the case whether the 
institution involved is coeducational or whether it is single sex. For example, 
the introduction to this Article referred to a well-publicized decision by Smith 
College, a women's college, to refuse to consider the application of a 
transgender student who identifies as female. 127 If this case were litigated, the 
statute's exclusion for private undergraduate admissions would prevent a court 
from providing the plaintiff with relief under Title IX, even if it was inclined to 
view Smith's decision as an act of sex discrimination. 
Interestingly, the coverage of the Smith College case has revealed that 
administrators at some historically-women's colleges believe Title IX requires 
them to exclude transgender-female students in order to remain single sex (or 
else, lose federal funding).12 8 Of course, Title IX's exclusion for private 
125. Schroer's job offer was rescinded when she came out about her impending 
transition. It therefore has the closest factual analogy to cases involving discrimination due 
to a present-tense transition on the job. Without the ongoing transition, discrimination 
appears to be more likely directed at the plaintiff s transgender status per se. 
126. See supraPart I.A. 
127. See supra Introduction. 
128. Mia Council, The Fight Over Trans* Women at Smith Sparks Debate, THE 
SOPHIAN, Apr. 3, 2013, available at http://www.smithsophian.com/news/the-fight-over­
trans-women-at-smith-sparks-debate-1.3019987#.UWMZtlfheSr (reporting that, "A common 
anxiety on campus is that if Smith admits a transgender woman, its status as a women's 
college will be in legal jeopardy under Title IX); Dylan Peters McCoy, Transgender 
Applicant'sRejection Causes Stir, DAILY HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, Mar. 26, 2013, availableat 
http://www.gazettenet.com/search/5274688-95/smith-college-students-transgender (quoting 
Mount Holyoke College President Lynn Pasquerella's fears that admitted transwomen would 
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undergraduate admissions also operates to belie any such claim. These 
administrators seem to consider themselves governed by Title IX's exception 
for admissions practices of undergraduate institutions that "traditionally and 
continually from its establishment has had a policy of admitting students of 
only one sex," even though this is the exception for public single-sex 
undergraduate institutions. Private undergraduate programs are not under a 
similar obligation to demonstrate continuity of admitting only women in order 
to remain legally free under Title IX to exclude men.12 9 And even if they were 
under an obligation of continuity, Title IX does not preclude a single sex 
institution from considering a transgender woman who has applied for 
admission to be a woman, not a man.130 Moreover, because the exclusion for 
private undergraduate programs is limited to admissions, Title IX does not 
permit private institutions to discriminate on the basis of sex against a student 
who is already admitted.13 ' A transgender student who transitions from female 
to male while in college would therefore be protected from exclusion by Title 
IX, even if the college he attends is a women's college. For example, in 2011, 
Hollins University, a private women's college in Virginia, was reported to have 
a policy of expelling any student who transitions from female to male, or who 
has "taken a step towards transition.'1 32 If Hollins ever acted on this policy, it 
would clearly violate Title IX, which permits private institutions to refuse to 
admit male students, but does not permit lawfully expelling them.133 
C. Sex-Segregated Contexts 
So far, this Part has considered Title IX's application to the type of 
discrimination that transgender students could experience in contexts analogous 
to the workplace, and where it is, due to this analogy, relatively easy to imagine 
how Title VII case law might be deployed. Yet while the workplace is 
generally not formally segregated by sex, education has many aspects that are. 
As described in Part I, an increasing number of schools are experimenting with 
single-sex classrooms. Colleges and universities make dormitory, hall, or room 
assignments based on sex, and schools of all levels offer separate athletic teams 
for men and women. Title IX has not yet been called upon to address 
violate Title IX: "We're constrained by the law," Pasquerella said. "Ifsomeone is not legally 
female, we can't admit them and keep our federal funding."). 
129. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (2012) (excluding all private undergraduate 
admissions from Title IX's scope) with 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(5) (providing an exception to 
Title IX for admissions of public undergraduate institutions which are "traditionally and 
continually" single sex). 
130. See generally20 U.S.C. § 1681 (containing no definition of sex). 
131. Id § 1681(a)(1). 
132. Don Troop, Women's Univ. to Reconsider HardLine on Transgender, CHRON. 
OF HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 23, 2011, available at http://chronicle.com/article/Womens-
University­
to/129490/?key-SzOmKFIwYSIEZnllNzoWZT1QYCNhMkl 7YyYdPi0nbltUFg%3D%3D. 
133. Moreover, the mere existence of that policy could be considered as part of a case 
of institutional harassment of students based on either their male sex or gender 
nonconformity. 
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transgender discrimination in such cases. When it is, to what extent will Title 
VII precedent assist advocates and courts seeking to apply Title IX? 
Imagine that a transgender college student who identifies as male requests 
housing in a men's dormitory, but is denied. Title IX expressly permits colleges 
13 4and universities to segregate housing by sex. Therefore, the college can 
legally exclude from the dormitory someone whose sex is female, and the 
student will not succeed by claiming discrimination on the basis of his (female) 
natal sex. A typical, Price Waterhouse style gender nonconformity analysis is 
also of limited value here, since it does not accurately describe the 
discrimination in this case. This plaintiff is not being excluded from the men's 
dorm because he is a gender-nonconforming woman, since no women are 
assigned to the men's dorm, gender conforming or otherwise. 
The student could argue, relying in Schroer, that he is being discriminated 
against because of his transition. However, this is not likely to be an accurate 
description of the discrimination, either. This isn't a case like an employer who 
eagerly hires Jews, eagerly hires Christians, but has it in for anyone who 
converts from one to the other. The male dormitory in this case accepts men, 
but lawfully excludes women. It excludes our student-plaintiff not because it 
sees him as a "convert" but because it does not see him as a man. 
However, a compelling argument for this plaintiff is that he is being 
excluded from the male dormitory because, unlike other men who are accepted 
to the dorm, he is a transgender man.'35 He could thus frame his case as one of 
sex discrimination on the grounds best articulated by the EEOC in Macy: that 
gender identity is one of the components of sex, so discriminating against 
someone on the basis of gender identity is necessarily discrimination on the 
basis of sex. Importantly, this theory requires the plaintiff to frame his gender 
identity as it relates to his sex assigned at birth, that is, to argue that he is 
excluded because of his transgenderidentity. It won't work for him to argue 
that he is excluded because of his male identity, because that would identify 
him as similar, not different, from the men who are accepted to the dormitory, 
and thus obscure gender identity as the basis for exclusion. 
Yet, the necessary focus on transgender gender identity (rather than male 
gender identity) is not likely to be problematic. In states where gender identity 
has been enumerated as a protected category in antidiscrimination statutes, 
134. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.32(b)(1) (2013) ("A recipient may provide separate housing 
on the basis of sex."). See also id § 106.33 ("A recipient may provide separate toilet, locker 
room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities provided for students of 
one sex shall be comparable to such facilities provided for students of the other sex."); id § 
106.41(b) ("Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section, a recipient 
may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each sex where selection for such 
teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport."). 
135. The Department of Education's recent decision to accept jurisdiction over a Title 
IX complaint involving a transgender student sex-segregated bathroom matching her gender 
identity suggests that the agency has implicitly adopted this interpretation of Title IX. 
FederalGovernment Resolves ComplaintFiledby CA TransgenderStudent, TARGET NEWS 
SERVICE (July 24, 2013) http://www.nclrights.org/press-room/press-release/federal­
govemment-resolves-complaint-filed-by-ca-transgender-student/. 
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those interpreting such laws have concluded that they prohibit classifying 
individuals in a manner that conflicts with their gender identity. For example, 
state agencies in both Massachusetts and Connecticut have each considered 
how the state's statutory ban on gender identity discrimination applies to the 
sex-segregated context of athletics.'36 In summer of 2012, the Massachusetts 
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education promulgated regulations 
implementing the state education law, which had recently been amended to 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity. 137 The agency's 
regulations clarify that the new law gives students the right to play on a male or 
female team, consistent with the student's gender identity.138 As the agency 
reasoned, "[e]xcluding a transgender student from a team that does not match 
the gender listed on the student's birth records would constitute unlawful 
discrimination on the basis of gender identity."' 39 In similar fashion, the 
Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, which enforces 
that state's antidiscrimination statute, also recently amended to include gender 
identity as a protected category, interprets the law to allow students to use 
locker rooms, bathrooms, and athletic opportunities in a manner consistent with 
their gender identity.140 
Besides a gender identity-based framing, there is yet one more possibility 
for framing the case of a transgender man excluded from a men's dormitory as 
one of sex discrimination under Title IX. The student could allege that he has 
been excluded from the men's dormitory based on gender nonconformity, but 
not as a gender nonconforming woman; rather as a gender nonconforming man. 
Specifically, he might argue that he is gender nonconforming in the sense that 
society expects men to have male anatomy, chromosomes, and a male gender 
marker on their birth certificates, indicia of masculinity that this male student 
lacks. This argument would break new ground, since gender nonconformity 
heretofore has considered the transgender plaintiffs expressed and visible 
departures from societal expectations associated with hir birth sex. Courts have 
not, with the possible-but even then, implicit-exception of Kastl, applied the 
gender nonconformity theory to address discrimination on the basis of an 
individual's invisible departures from societal expectations associated with hir 
expressed gender. 
136. 603 Mass. Code Regs. 26.05 (2012); Guidelinesfor Connecticut Schools to 
Comply with Gender Identity andExpression Non-DiscriminationLaws, CONNECTICUT SAFE 
SCHOOL COALITION, 
http://www.ct.gov/chro/lib/chro/GuidelinesforSchools-onGender Identityand Expressi 
on_final_4-24-12.pdf. 
137. 603 Mass. Code Regs. 26.01. 
138. Id.at 26.06. 
139. Memorandum from Mitchell Chester, Commissioner, Massachusetts Department 
of Elementary and Secondary Education, to Members of the Board of Elementary and 
Secondary Education (June 19, 2012), availableat http://www.doe.mass.edu/boe/docs/2012­
06/item5.html 
140. Guidelines for Connecticut Schools to Comply with Gender Identity and 
Expression Non-DiscriminationLaws, supra note 136. 
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Such an argument would not be persuasive in jurisdictions that still cling 
to Ulane's rejection of sex being defined as anything other than biological sex. 
It not only requires a court to accept what Ulane would not-that sex consists 
of multiple constituent parts - anatomy, chromosomes, gender identity and 
expression-but to give primacy to gender identity and expression as the 
measure of one's "sex" for purposes of Title IX. To the contrary, it requires a 
court to accept, as the EEOC did in Macy, a definition of sex that is not 
restricted to biology. If "sex" means "gender," then failure to externally 
conform to expectations consistent with one's internal (biological) sex can be 
inverted to mean failure to internally conform to expectations consistent with 
one's external (expressed) gender. Of all theories discussed so far, this is the 
one that most accurately strikes at the heart of the nature of discrimination at 
issue: the institution's failure to treat this student as a man like any other. 
In the harassment, admissions, and expulsion contexts discussed above, 
transgender plaintiffs had multiple options ranging from tried-and-true Price 
Waterhouse-style gender nonconformity, to new and emerging theories for 
extending sex discrimination to include discrimination based on one's 
transition (Schroer) or one's gender identity (Macy). In contrast, such options 
are limited for transgender plaintiffs challenging exclusion from sex-segregated 
contexts like dorm rooms, bathrooms, athletic teams, or single-sex classes, 
since traditional gender nonconformity, and transition-based discrimination do 
not apply. This distinction serves to underscore the significance of Macy, which 
provides courts a persuasively reasoned, deference-worthy authority for a 
contemporary interpretation of "sex," that gives rise to both the gender-identity 
based discrimination, or the "reverse gender nonconformity" theory discussed 
above. 
CONCLUSION 
The Members of Congress who debated and voted on Title IX surely did 
not have in mind the law's specific application to transgender students. Yet 
since the time of the law's passage, as transgender Americans and the 
discrimination they face has become increasingly visible, our collective 
understanding of what it means to discriminate on the basis of sex has also 
expanded. Borrowing largely from sex discrimination cases in the related 
context of employment, we can now impose a variety of interpretations, some 
or all of which could apply to transgender discrimination, depending on the 
nature and the context of that discrimination as discussed above. Whether or 
not they thought about transgender students, Title IX's champions were 
committed to ensuring that everyone receive a fair opportunity to pursue 
education or employment in the educational institutions of our country. All 
efforts to use Title IX for the purpose protecting transgender students from 
discrimination fit squarely within that goal. 

